Washington has rediscovered Myanmar’s chaotic borderlands—again. After cutting aid to the countryin early 2025, the US now promises Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) “strike forces” who claim to work with the Royal Thai Police in their War Room Task Force in Bangkok, investigating and combatting scam compounds in Myanmar. Washington is even rumored to be offering a $25-million reward for the arrest of people organizing scam centers across Southeast Asia, although no Myanmar names have yet appeared on Department of State lists. But in a borderland already battered by Chinese security operations, the regime’s offensives and Thai crackdowns, the obvious question remains:
What exactly does the FBI think it can accomplish in territory where the US already has over 70 years of experience attempting such crackdowns?
In short, the US, after abruptly canceling humanitarian and other aid programs to Myanmar last February, has now discovered the scam centers in places like Shwe Kokko. More “striking” into the Myanmar scam centers is strange, I think, from a Myanmar perspective. After all, scam centers have recently been “struck” by the Chinese government and Myanmar military artillery, and the Royal Thai Police apparently already had that War Room Task Force to address the issue. In recent weeks, there has been shelling, bombing runs, mass arrests, deportations and even a few trials and death sentences handed down by China. What will the FBI add to this, except theater designed for the Washington press corps? The Americans are doing this to satisfy domestic audiences, not to help Myanmar establish its own capacity to govern.
So is there nothing else that can be done about the human trafficking and fraud associated with the scam centers? The answer is, “probably not too much”, or at least, probably nothing that will stop the scam center problem from reappearing a few months later. Rarely has trying the same unsuccessful policies of the past achieved a different result. In the case of highland Myanmar, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began sending in “strike forces” at least as early as the 1950s in attempts to keep China out with “Operation Paper.” After that the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was established in 1972 to strike down the trade in opium production, then heroin labs, then methamphetamine labs, and finally now in the 2020s the US interest has shifted to striking scam centers. The “three letter agencies” the US has sent in over the last 75 years include the CIA, DEA, DOD (Department of Defense), DOS (Department of State) and now the FBI. Even the fictional renegade American John Rambo briefly organized a strike force in Myanmar to rescue a family of American missionaries from the Burmese Army, as chronicled in the movie starring Sylvester Stallone.
And more recently, in 2008, the whole US Seventh Fleet attempted to strike into Myanmar with relief goods following Cyclone Nargis; in a tragic-comic series of diplomatic errors the suspicions of the military government regarding US intentions were aroused by such a large military force, and the cyclone victims were permitted to suffer more. In short, there has never been a shortage of Americans ready to make a “strike,” to arrest or kill the people that they fear, and to advocate the policies they equate with “the rule of law.” Certainly the Border Guard Forces (BGFs) running Shwe Kokko, etc., offer good candidates for arrest. But the American attention span is short. After all the “strike force” operations are finished, a predictable outcome is that new scam centers will pop up for Myanmar’s peoples to deal with.
Tried before
The earliest outsiders seeking to apply their “rule of law” in Myanmar came after 1824 when the British first invaded to assert rights to “free trade,” and especially after 1885, when the Indo-British armies sought to quell the “dacoits” and other rebellions in the new colony using, well, “strike forces,” which seized contraband, burned villages and moved villagers into places where the British could maintain control. The US would adopt this approach—they called it the “strategic hamlet” policy—during the American War in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Japanese also tried to make Burma part of the Greater East Asian Prosperity Sphere during World War II, which did not work out very well for Burma’s peoples either, and British, Chinese and American forces invaded in 1945 in response. There were civil wars in 1949-50 fought between the national government in Yangon (then Rangoon), the Communist Party of Burma in the north, Karen forces in the Irrawaddy Delta, and others around the periphery.
After a brief period of relatively democratic rule under U Nu from 1950 or so until 1962, the military under General Ne Win moved in and established military rule, which except for the period 2011-2021 in many respects has continued to this day. That military rule led to the “Four Cuts” policies, which used military strike forces to attack and burn highland villages that had displeased the military government. In many respects, this was a continuation of colonial-era British pacification policies, and American strategic hamlet polices from Vietnam: extraordinarily violent strike forces, and not very effective follow up. Which is why I think that the FBI’s operations against scam operations will also be unsuccessful. After some destruction, newspaper headlines, etc., the scam centers will simply re-establish themselves in another remote corner beyond the reach of the international community, continuing to prey upon the vulnerabilities of foreigners, and especially Myanmar’s peoples.
Domestic consumption
American indictments have been issued before—large amounts of money were spent by the State Department, DEA and CIA to bring indicted drug traffickers to American justice, particularly after the DEA was established in 1972, leading to the export of the “War on Drugs” to Burma, which involved strike forces from the Americans, and the provision of police assistance to the military junta. An illustrative story is that of Khun Sa, who “reigned” among the extra-legal traders of the highlands from the 1960s until 1996. How important was he to the Americans? In 1990, then US Attorney General Richard Thornburgh referred to Khun Sa as the “Prince of Death,” because he was “the largest dope dealer in the Golden Triangle.” He was credited with marketing half of the world’s supply of illegal opium during the 1980s.
Khun Sa (John Rambo’s Nemesis)
The most impressive US-coordinated strike occurred in January 1982 against Khun Sa on the Thai side of the border, where his headquarters was established at Ban Hin Taek, with the acquiescence of Thai generals. The Americans, frustrated with Khun Sa, pressed the Thai military to strike at Ban Hin Daek, and they did so by creating a fake Burmese militia to capture him. The militia’s strike failed dismally, and most of its 39 members were killed. Angered, the Thai army assembled an even larger strike force of 1,000-plus soldiers, and flattened Ban Hin Taek in early 1982, in an operation which must have made their American sponsors proud. But as for Khun Sa? His operation just moved across the border, and he continued to produce high-quality heroin until 1996, when a made-for-TV “surrender” was arranged by the CIA, and publicized around the world. As for the New York indictment, that was never served, and Khun Sa would die of old age in Yangon in 2007 surrounded by his mistresses—a death covered on The Economist magazine’s obituary page.
But Americans have short memories; I guess the planned FBI operations sound good to an American audience today—even though they themselves are unlikely to succeed in the long run. Just as 50-plus years of attacks on drug production have not changed the fact that Myanmar is still one of the largest producers of illegal drugs in the world, a few months of strike forces, and even the death or capture of a few “scam kingpins” is unlikely to dent the scam operations or for that matter the continuing production of drugs.
The problem, I think, is that scam centers, like drug-processing labs, emerge wherever there are areas where there is no legitimate government, making the polities “invisible” to the international community. There are plenty of such areas in Myanmar, i.e., isolated areas where officials from Naypyitaw are afraid to go, and which are viewed as illegitimate. In their place are local leaders like Khun Sa who may rule cruelly, but who locals believe will protect them from violent raids, from junta helicopters and artillery, and from US strike forces.
What works on drug control
The funny thing is that a successful drug eradication program has taken place in neighboring Thailand. Thailand had a problem with drug production as recently as the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, some highland peoples were beyond the reach of the Thai state, as a mix of ethnic minorities, and the Thai Communist Party hunkered down with support from China and Laos. The rebellious areas grew opium poppies, and corrupted parts of the Thai military, who became their distributors via Bangkok. Thailand used strike forces to control drug production in the 1960s and 1970s, and with American support launched military campaigns against the rebels who grew the opium. This did not work, so Thailand shifted policy in the 1980s.
The response of the Thai government to the highland problem was to encourage the establishment of a legitimate state in areas where the government was still weak. In the 1980s the Thai government changed to a multi-pronged approach, which put economic development—including crop substitution, agricultural extension services, primary school construction, the provision of public health programs, road construction and opportunities for secondary and university education—to the forefront. Amnesties for former rebels were also a part of the Thai approach. Actual law enforcement, i.e., arrests and asset seizure, continued, but were used only when other approaches failed. Particularly effective was the assistance from King Bhumiphol (Rama IX) and his family, who made a point of personally visiting the villages receiving the new services, and emphasizing to the highlanders that they were welcome within the Thai kingdom. By the 1990s, these programs were more or less successful, the rebellions and drug production had decreased, and legitimate activities expanded.
Conclusion
In short, Myanmar’s borderlands have long absorbed the “strikes” of outside powers. British colonial police, Chinese security forces, Thai generals and US drug warriors have all given strike forces a try at one time or another. This is why I feel comfortable writing that highlanders will likely absorb the FBI’s operations carried out in conjunction with the Thai police’s ‘war room’. Kinetic operations, whether conducted by the Chinese, Thai, Burmese junta, or Americans can temporarily disrupt drug production labs, scam facilities and poppy production, and generate headlines in the US and Thailand. But such operations have been undertaken before, and they are unlikely to transform Myanmar’s highlands any more than the raids on Khun Sa, or before that Operation Paper. What is really needed is a legitimate and democratic state. Until then, the scam centers will simply move, adapt, and reappear in the many areas that the junta cannot subdue violently. For all the talk in Washington of strike forces, the real work lies in the slow, unglamorous business of building political legitimacy. Anything less is wishful thinking.
In short, to address scam centers and transnational crime, Myanmar first and foremost requires the establishment of a civilian government that receives legitimacy from Myanmar’s peoples. That government must be committed to enforcing the rule of law in a way that does not sacrifice its legitimacy. Such a government will ensure accountability to Myanmar’s peoples, not the Chinese or Americans, for controlling criminal activities. Such a government will engage the military and ethnic forces in ways that strike forces tasked by Washington can never do because they derive legitimacy from the governed. Another way for Washington to fight scam centers would be to shift the the millions being spent on strike forces back into the USAID accounts that supported educational opportunities, agricultural extension, health programs, rural road construction, etc., but which were terminated last February. To do this though, the Americans would also need to recognize that the underlying problem of Myanmar is the absence of a legitimate government since February 1, 2021, which is unlikely to be resolved by quick FBI operations to arrest “scam king-pins.”
Tony Waters is a visiting professor at Leuphana University, Germany. Previously he was a Professor of Sociology at Payap University, Chiangmai and California State University, Chico. His most recent book about Myanmar is General Ne Win’s Legacy of Burmanization in Myanmar, with Saw Eh Htoo.
Adapted slightly from https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/washington-rediscovers-myanmars-chaotic-borderlands.html
Tony Waters is czar and editor of Ethnography.com. He came to us from the Sociology department at California State University at Chico where he has been a professor since 1996. In 2016 though he suddenly found himself with a new gig at Payap University in northern Thailand where he is on the faculty of the Peace Studies Department. He has also been a guest professor in Germany, and Tanzania. In the past, his main interests have been international development and refugees in Thailand, Tanzania, and California. This reflects a former career in the Peace Corps (Thailand), and refugee camps (Thailand and Tanzania). His books include: Crime and Immigrant Youth (1999), Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan (2001), The Persistence of Subsistence Agriculture: Life Beneath of the Marketplace (2007), When Killing is a Crime (2007), and Schooling, Bureaucracy, and Childhood: Bureaucratizing the Child (2012). His hobby is trying to learn strange languages–and the mistakes that that implies. Tony is a prolific academic, you can read more of his work at academia.edu.or purchase one (or more!) of his books from Amazon.com.