I Hope That The Human Terrain Teams Read The Deceivers by John Masters: An Anthropological Novel

One of my favorite all-time historical novels is The Deceivers by John Masters. Published in 1952, the protagonist William Savage is an administrator in a remote district for the British East Indian Company. The book is set in 1825. Savage speaks four Indian languages, and has spent 19 years in the colonial service. As a colonial administrator, he is “the law” in his district. But to do this, he lives in an Indian village, embedded in Indian cultures and languages. No garrisoned “Forward Operating Base” with a VCR, pool table, video games, or other comforts of home for him!

Savage discovers a nihilistic death cult, the Thug, which waylays, robs, and kills travelers. Turns out that the cult has been around for 200 years during which it has killed something like one million people across India, including dozens in Savage’s own district. In short, it is the world’s greatest murder mystery. Savage goes undercover, learns about the intricacies of the Thug cult dedicated to the goddess Kali. He even learns to strangle using a cloth rumel. After some rip-roaring good adventures and spooky mysticism, Savage convinces the British colonial powers that they have a responsibility to pursue the cult, and make India’s roads safe for travel. And though it is beyond the scope of the novel, the British do this—by enforcing the laws in ways that both respect British legal traditions, and destroy the anarchy in which brigands, death cults, and robbers flourish. John Master’s interpretation of this is made possible by both his own personal experience in India—he was the fifth generation of his family born in British India—and attention to the importance of ritual, religion, empathy, and morality in ordering human affairs.

The strength of the novel is in its story—it is a great adventure book. But my latest reading also impresses on me that it is an anthropological story too. The British are imposing their justice system, rooted in western morality, in early nineteenth century India. This is a problem that sometimes crosses cultural boundaries effectively, but at other times exposes British naivete. Spookier, are the accounts of how the religious cult ties together Thug gangs Masters’ cleverly describes the power ritual gives them to kill, rob, and terrorize. Which of course leads the book to another important anthropological point, which is that religion and religious commitment are essential to understanding people, and what they do. Finally, the book implicitly illustrates how important anthropological skills like empathy, language skills, and cultural understanding are for understanding another cultural world. In doing this, Master’s makes the point that cultural experience matters—what makes possible Savage’s investigation in the first place is his affinity for India, and his ability in four languages.
This for me brings up anthropology’s recent engagement with the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Agree or disagree with it, in at least one important way, the empire-building project of the British in the early nineteenth century, and the American in the early twenty-first century is similar. Both are challenging cults rooted in pre-modern conceptions of religious ecstasy which glorify killing and death. The odd thing is that the British, with their long-term commitment to empire do the anthropologically correct thing and develop staff like Savage (or perhaps for that matter Masters’ own real-life family) that engage with locals to extend their concept of empire.

But the Americans in their wars against Al Qaeda and other groups in Afghanistan and Iraq, have shorter-term post-imperial goals, and perhaps as a result do not engage their opponents as effectively. After reading The Deceivers, the American effort really seems like “empire light” because it substitutes high-tech for culturally savvy administrators like Wiliam Savage. America’s post-imperial mindset, along with an implicit faith in the capacity of American technology, law, and economic might complete the substitution. Thus, today, the Americans are more comfortable with the technology of drones that can be “flown” over Afghanistan from a desk at CIA headquarters in northern Virginia, than they are with developing language skills which are created only by living for years in a culture. This preference for short-term technological fixes is I think ultimately the culture that Mark Dawson and others from the Human Terrain Team are up against when trying to peddle anthropological ideas. They want the Americans to think like William Savage. But in the American war effort, technology, not cultural competence, is central.

On a certain level, I appreciate that the US American military is becoming aware that culture matters when confronting nihilistic cults like Al Qaeda. But let’s face it, despite the fact that Al Qaeda may have some similarities with the nineteenth century Thug cults the US military is not producing the William Savages to confront Al Qaeda. Instead they are creating computer jockeys who reduce the problem to what is seen on a computer screen. In doing this, they ignore the power of ritualistic cults, and religious mysticism that drives such groups in the first place.

Programs like Human Terrain Team could presumably fill this hole, but I doubt if they ever will. If HTT does their job, they will point out the limitations of drone attacks in destroying religious cults rooted in ethics very different than that of the US military. Ultimately, I wonder though whether the modern US military with its own culture invested in high tech is suited to confront traditions of religious ecstasy, nihilism, and the anarchy of remote places like today’s rural Iraq, rural Afghanistan, or rural Pakistan. If today’s planners don’t quite believe this sociologist from Chico, they should have a look at John Master’s book The Deceivers. Besides enjoying a good read, they may also get some advice about how to confront the ninilistic religious cults like Al Qaeda.

7 thoughts on “I Hope That The Human Terrain Teams Read The Deceivers by John Masters: An Anthropological Novel

  1. I read the book last night. Fun, started after dinner and stayed up to the end after midnight. But I can’t find any new tips for fighting the Taliban. Learn the language? Got it, that’s old news. Understand the culture? Got that one too. Grow up five generations of occupying forces in their country? I guess that’s why Bush and friends called it the endless war. But really, what’s the book got to teach us about the war? I think it’s pretty far fetched.

  2. Hi Jon:
    Mainly, I guess that it would teach us that nihilistic cults like Al Qaeda and Thugees are best addressed with police-like action and courts rather than the broad stroke of “war” undertaken by 19 year-olds. The British did not fight a “war” like the US is today; rather they conducted law enforcement operations using highly skilled middle aged guys who spoke languages, etc.

    I know that that such broad policy is beyond the purview of HTS, so perhaps I should have recommended the book to the generals who design policy, rather than the HTS on the ground. Like you said, they probably already get this at the gut level. But just because social scientists from HTS gets it, doesn’t mean that the policy will change.

  3. ha ha. you may know about the foreign area officer program… the army and other branches train folks and they spend extensive time in a region. then at about 45 years old they can’t get promoted anymore and retire. imagine the expertise accumulated if you kept these guys around another two decades, and what they could impart to the young guys. I guess this all falls under “preaching to the choir.” those who are listening already know. those who need to know arent listening.

  4. Yeah, the bureaucracies of the United States (e.g. State and Defense) are really not set up to be effective empire administrators, like the British Colonial Service was. This creates staffing problems for when the US invades other countries and tries to administer them. But in the post-imperial era is probably not such a bad thing.

  5. Hi Jon-

    I was just talking about the FAOs with someone the other day. During my 9 months in Iraq I never met a single one. They were rare as hen’s teeth as the saying goes. I met some people that should have been in the line to be a FAO though. The problem is as you say, it is a LOT of training and expertise to build up for what is going to ultimately be a transitory job (like so many in the military). All that expertise is then lost..

  6. I’m not sure how relevant The Deceivers is to current middle east policy, but it’s a really good book, really memorable.

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